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SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN

context. None of these things are ends in themselves. They involve
objectives that have to be weighed against others. This leads to the
very final point, which Bob Mundheim and Charlie Brower have both
raised. Given the ambiguity of article 52, in other respects, what is the
advantage to the world community of interpreting that article in a
way which would deny to a party against which force has been used
or threatened the strategy of making a treaty to remove the force? Is it
not self-defeating? If you think of that in terms of the debate whether
the threat or use of force includes economic force, you might very well
conclude that article 52 has the potential of being the bane of the
treaty system.
Ved Nanda: I share Hans Smit's concerns. Michael Reisman and
others have written about forceful intervention, 87 its problems and
likely abuse. But at this stage, to demand that there be a unqualified
prohibition, to hold to the kind of narrow interpretation of the Charter that the purists hold, would be a great disservice to the international legal order.
Frank Mayer: The Reagan Administration apparently decided
not to press the duress argument. As Covey Oliver observed, 88 duress
cuts both ways. The Iranians might well consider the use of economic
force in seizing twelve billion dollars worth of their assets as against
fifty-two hostages the kind of coercive force which, from their point of
view, aborts the settlement treaty. If you believe, as I do, that international arbitration of this nature will advance international order
and the peaceful resolution of disputes, then we should leave well
enough alone.
THE NULLIFICATION OF ATrACHMENTS; SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
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Alan Swan: We should now turn to what is perhaps one of the
more difficult, complex, and central areas of our overall problem, one

that obviously leads to the constitutional discussion; namely, the statutory predicates for the Government's action in the private litigation.
The Government has, by Executive order, undertaken to suspend the
law suits,' to nullify the prejudgment attachments,9 0 and to nullify
87. E.g., Reisman, Termination of the USSR's Treaty Right of Intervention in
Iran, 74 AM.J.INT'L L. 144 (1980).
88. Supra at 96.
89. Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981) [for text, see infra
Appendix at 82].
90. Exec. Order No. 12277, 46 Fed. Reg. 7915 (1981) [for text, see infra Appendix at 64].
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completely certain classes of claims. 9' I suppose there are several
aspects to the subject. While it may not be possible to keep the
discussion neatly separated along these lines, let me suggest the need
to keep in mind a distinction between cases in which the prejudgment
attachment was entirely dependant upon the government license under the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 92 because such assets were
otherwise immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunites Act, 93 and cases in which the attached assets were not entitled
to immunity under that act. To my mind, the question of whether the
Executive can point to an adequate statutory predicate for its actions
may differ markedly in these two cases. This also introduces the
difficult problem of which assets are immune and which assets, if any,
are not immune. In all events, to begin our exploration of these
problems, I have asked Larry Newman to start by outlining the
litigating position that his group is taking and then ask all of you to
intervene with your views on the problem. Larry.
Lawrence Newman: I will try to give you a sort of overview of
what the litigating position, as I understand it, is around the country,
particularly in New York. I know that there have been constitutional
challenges to the agreements in Washington, Boston, and Dallas.
There is the EDS 4 opinion which finds that the Government did act
unconstitutionally. Mark Feldman asked me last week what the New
York claimants are going to be doing. I think the Government is very
interested in what is going on in New York because there are briefs
due on Monday, March 9, in the second circuit, and the Government
has put in a very good brief.9 5 It now appears that our adversary is
primarily the Government. The procedural posture is that there were
ninety-six cases consolidated before Judge Duffy in what we have, in
New York, called a confirmation of attachments proceeding.9" This
actually represents the other side of a motion to vacate. Those obligatory motions to confirm were made, and Judge Duffy, to whom the

91. Exec. Orders Nos. 12278-12281, 46 Fed. Reg. 7917-7924 (1981) [for texts, see
infra Appendixes at 66-73].

92. 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1980), supra note 11.
93. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2891, codified in, 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2) to 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976)
[hereinafter Immunities Act] [for selected portions of the text, see infra Appendix at

188].
94. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Social Security Org. of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350
(N.D. Tex. 1981).
95. See supra note 33.
96. N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 6211(b) (McKinney 1980). See New England Merchant's
Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power, 502 F.Supp. 120, 123, n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN

task was assigned of ruling on the so-called "common questions,"
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, employing a theory of his own that was
not very strongly urged before him. Essentially, he concluded that the
Government had taken away the sovereign immunity of Iran by
virtue of having promulgated the freeze regulations. Interlocutory
appeals were then taken by permission of Judge Duffy. The United
States Government intervened, sought a stay, and moved to mandamus Judge Duffy. The Government's brief, a lengthy one, is an
97
expansion of Civiletti's opinion of January 19th.
Mark Feldman asked me what we were going to do and I told
him I did not know because we had not really made up our minds.
We have, I confess, had some difficulty in deciding how to do it. The
reason is that people's positions differ. Many of the plaintiffs were not
terribly unhappy with the arbitral tribunal. There are some-depending primarily on how the forum selection clause is interpreted-who
are very unhappy. We left it that those of us on the steering committee
who felt inclined to a particular position would write briefs in support
of those positions. As a result, yesterday, March 6, the firms involved
in these cases were given a choice of four different briefs. They were
told, "You can sign your name to one of these briefs or, if you want,
hurry up and write a brief by Monday." There was a brief proposed
by Cleary, Gottlieb that dealt with the issue by suggesting that it
really was not ripe for determination by the court of appeals and that
it should be remanded to the district court for a determination on
various factual questions. Townley, Updike prepared a brief that
dealt with the problem of defining "enterprise" under the 1955 Treaty
of Amity. 98 Coudert Brothers prepared a brief that was essentially
along the lines of the EDS99 position in Dallas. I call it a frontal
97. Letter from Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti to President Carter (Jan.
19, 1981) (expressing an opinion on the legality of the United States-Iran Agreements)
[hereinafter Civiletti Opinion Letter] [for text, see infra Appendix 84].
98. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955,
United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 889, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93. [hereinafter
cited as 1955 Treaty] [for the text of selected portions of the 1955 Treaty, see infra
Appendix at 176]. The relevant text is as follows:
4. No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corporations, associations, and government agencies and instrumentalities,

which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial,
industrial, shipping or other business activities within the territories of the
other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its
property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or
other liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are
subject therein.

Id. art. XI, para. 4.
99. 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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assault on the constitutionality of the Executive's actions, with the
expectation that those who subscribed to this point of view were
prepared to deal with the status quo ante that would result. Baker &
McKenzie, our firm, took a middle ground. We are urging the court
not to declare anything unconstitutional but to find that property
rights, primarily the attachments, have been taken, but that the value
of the taking or, indeed, whether the attachments were of any value,
is a matter that cannot now be determined and will depend on how
we are satisfied through the arbitral mechanism. If we find that we
are fully satisfied, then we will not have a claim for the taking of a
property right, but if not, then we will. I talked to my office over
lunch time and it seems that there are eighteen firms that have signed
on to our brief. I do not know how many have signed on to the others,
but one of the firms that has apparently signed our brief is Coudert
Brothers. They are apparently not mounting a frontal assault on the
constitutionality of the settlement. If they are not doing so, I do not
know who is. So we may find ourselves with some pussycats in New
York as opposed to tigers.
In our brief, we address one of the concerns that we have had
from the outset, namely, the role of the 1955 Treaty. It is a problem
on which the Government has never really been forthcoming. I find
that a little disturbing. It is our position, and has been our position,
that the 1955 Treaty does constitute a waiver by Iran of immunity
from prejudgment attachment. In its Amicus Brief in the EDS case
before the second circuit last summer, and again in its Statement of
Interest dated February 26, 1981, the Government has said that many
of the claimants' attachments were invalid because, as with numerous
other treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN treaties), the 1955 Treaty waives immunity only for a publicly owned or
controlled commercial or business enterprise and not for any other
type of government agency. For example, it claims that the 1955
Treaty's waiver of immunity would apply to suits arising out of the
purchase of goods by a government airline but not by the army. I
mentioned this to the Justice Department and said, "You are, in fact,
admitting that there is a waiver of immunity from attachment under
the 1955 Treaty; why don't you just come out and say so?" They did
not really give me an answer, but they did agree with my interpretation. I think it would be helpful, not only for these cases but for any
other case involving an FCN treaty, to have this question settled. The
whole role of the attachment of a foreign sovereign's assets and the
question of the waiver of immunity from attachment can come up
under something like eleven or twelve FCN treaties. I think it correct
to say that there waivers of immunity from attachment contained in
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those treaties, but apparently the Government's position is that the
waiver is only in the case of an attachment against an enterprise that
is engaged in some kind of commercial activity.
Mark Feldman: Let me put the Government's position in these
terms: there is a waiver of immunity from suit in the 1955 Treaty and
in certain other FCN treaties, but that waiver is only for suits against
commercial enterprises, qua commercial enterprises. It does not apply
to the Government itself. I think we would continue to maintain that,
with regard to attachments, there is no explicit waiver under the 1955
Treaty. Thus, the only issue upon which we think one can have an
argument concerns the relationship between the savings clause in
section 1609 of the Immunities Act' 00 and the 1955 Treaty. Section
1609, in effect, provides that a waiver of immunity from attachment
under an existing international agreement remains in full effect even
if the conditions for a waiver contained in the Immunities Act have
not been met-even if under that Act the foreign government would
be immune from attachment. The issue is whether the operation of
that savings clause requires an explicit waiver of immunity from
attachment in the preexisting international agreement; or may it, for
purposes of that section, be an implicit waiver or something else? That
is the issue. We do not think that there is an explicit waiver of
immunity from attachment in the 1955 Treaty, but the Government
has not yet taken a position on whether such an explicit waiver is
required for purposes of the savings clause in section 1609.
Lawrence Newman: The Justice Department lawyers told me to
read the footnote in the Government's Statement of Interest carefully
and I would be able to divine from it the Government's position. I
have read it carefully, I think. I do divine a position that there is a
waiver but I do not know whether it comes out implicit or explicit.
Alan Swan: Let me just outline Judge Fisher's position on this
issue' 0' which I find interesting because I do not think Judge Duffy's
effort ' 2 to get around his theory was entirely persuasive. Judge Fisher

100. This section states:

Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of the enactment of this Act, the property in the United
States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment, arrest and
execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.
See supra note 93.
101. Behring Int'l Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J.
1979) (Fisher, J.).
102. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Co. 502 F. Supp. 120, 126
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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concludes that the savings clause of section 1609 saves the 1955 Treaty
as it was then written and understood. This meant that the treaty was
to be interpreted according to ordinary canons of construction, unaffected by policies adopted twenty-one years later in the Immunities
Act which requires an "explicit" waiver of immunity from prejudgement attachment. 03 He then examines the language of the 1955
Treaty and concludes that it waives immunity from all forms of
judicial proceedings, including prejudgment attachments. He does
not characterize this as either an explicit or implicit waiver. While the
treaty does not, in so many words, mention prejudgment attachments, there are words in the treaty which under normal canons of
construction indicate, according to Judge Fisher, that the parties
contemplated such attachments. Whether that constitutes an implicit
or explicit waiver is indeterminate and somewhat beside the point.
The effort at categorization falls prey, it seems to me, to Judge Duffy's
mistake. Judge Duffy was inclined to view the language in the 1955
Treaty through a lens colored by the policies of the Immunities Act,
which requires an explicit waiver. I find that approach unpersuasive.
The issue, I suggest, is whether Judge Fisher correctly read the intention of the parties as it stood when they negotiated and signed the
1955 Treaty. That, I suggest, is the only approach consistent with the
apparent intention of Congress in section 1609 to leave waivers under
existing agreements unaffected by the more restrictive requirements of
the Immunities Act.
Hans Smit: The only time that you get to this question is if you
assume that the provisions in the settlement with Iran that cancel all
existing attachments are somehow or other to be disregarded. You
never get to this issue unless you get by that hurdle.
Lawrence Newman: We are arguing the point because we do not
want the court to avoid the constitutional issue by deciding that we
103. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(d)(1978). The text states:
The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of this
chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be
immune from attachment prior to the entry of judgment in any action
brought in a court of the United States or of a State, or prior to the elapse
of the period of time provided in subsection (c) of this section, if(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to judgment, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms
of the waiver, and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state,
and not to obtain jurisdiction.
See supra note 93.
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never had any rights anyway because there was not a waiver; that is
what bothers us.
Hans Smit: Almost a year ago, I argued in Washington that one
of the many deficiencies of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was
that it knocked out prejudgment attachments. I was very surprised 10to5
04
find on that occasion that both Jack Stevenson and Monroe Leigh
agreed that that was one of the less desirable aspects of that Act.
There seemed to be a fairly general consensus that that part of it
should be knocked out. Now is there any initiative anywhere towards
amending the Immunities Act, so that you would not have to cope
with that problem?
Lawrence Newman: I do not know of any.
Mark Feldman: We have not had to crush any yet. [Laughter]
Edward Gordon: There is an initiative to harmonize the Immunities Act with the European Convention'0 6 and the State Immunities
07
Act of England.1
Oscar Schachter: That project does not involve this problem.
Charles Brower: The project to which you refer is part of an
effort by the International Law Association to draft an international
convention. We now have, in the section of International Law of the
American Bar Association, an ad hoc committee on revision of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the purpose of which is to develop
proposed amendments in conjunction with other professional societies
and then to try to work more formally with the interested government
people to bring about a revision of the Immunities Act. There are a lot
of areas that need work. Some are very simple, merely clarifying what
virtually everybody understands to have been meant but which may
not be totally clear. At the other end of the scale are proposed substantive revisions.
Edward Gordon: Do you recall from the history behind section
1609 whether these exeptions to the prohibition against prejudgment
attachments engendered a lot of debate? Were they circulated and
discussed?
Mark Feldman: Yes, Monroe Leigh and I argued for days, weeks
and months. He finally caved in because we had to have a unanimous
104. John R. Stevenson, former Legal Advisor, Department of State, 1969-72.
105. Monroe Leigh, former Legal Advisor, Department of State, 1975-77.
106. European Convention of State Immunity, May 16, 1972, reprinted in 11 Int'l
Legal Materials 470 (1972).
107. State Immunity Act of 1978, c. 33.
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position. The committees of Congress told us that we could not get a
bill through unless we had a consensus of the whole Bar. So it was a
long negotiation, over a period of two years.
Charles Brower: There was also some interchange with the
House International Affairs Committee on the section 1604 and section 1609 language which refers to "existing" international agreements. I think that was inserted at the insistence of the Committee,
which was concerned that the House of Representatives would not
sign off on any legislation that was subject to revision through treaties,
which only had to have Senate approval. Since it had relatively little
practical impact-if any, when you think about it-the insertion was
agreed to.
Michael Reisman: Back in 1955, at the time of the treaty with
Iran and after the Tate Letter"' the way to start a suit against a
foreign sovereign was by prejudgment attachment. This, of course,
was particularly rankling to foreign governments, and it was one of
the big trade-offs in 1976. This meant that in 1955, when Iran was
being persuaded to waive some of the incidents of sovereign immunity
that created a disequilibrium in disputes with U.S. nationals, it could
not have agreed to waive immunity from prejudgment attachments
because it did not have that immunity to waive. In the 1955 Treaty
the Iranian Government, in equalizing its position with U.S. nationals, in article 11, paragraph 4, had to waive things such as immunity from execution (and such immunity was certainly available to it).
But immunity from prejudgment attachment was not available to it
under any circumstance, so there was nothing to waive. Thus, if you
follow a strict interpretation of the 1955 Treaty, there could be no
waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachments. Iran could not
have been invited to grant the waiver and if invited would have said,
"What is there to waive?" Nor would an American negotiator have
demanded the waiver.
CharlesBrower: I would like to get back to the position taken by
the State Department to the effect that immunity is waived only as to
enterprises which are generally engaged in commercial activity. That
position is wholly unimaginable in a treaty which was negotiated
several years after the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity. The whole purpose of the treaty was to limit the then
existing immunities, rather than to expand them over what they were.
108. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Dept. of State, to
Phillip Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
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Now the answer that is given to that is that the treaty did limit
immunities in certain respects. It did waive immunity from execution.
But I still do not think that the Government's interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with the restrictive theory.
Mark Feldman: Not at all.
Michael Reisman: I do not quite understand why the Government says that the waiver applies only to commercial matters. It
seems to me that a waiver would cure virtually any immunity. In
other words, if I say, "I waive immunity," I waive it whether I am a
commercial or a political entity or involved in commercial or political
activities. Why do you limit the effective waiver only to commercial
entities or to political entities involved in commercial activities?
Mark Feldman: Because we are looking at the evidence. We look
at the text of the treaty and at the legislative history of comparable
treaties, and it is clear as a matter of record. Also, it was the interpretation of the Department publicly in proceedings before the Senate
concerning the granting of Senatorial consent to similar treaties. It is
reflected in published articles by negotiators who have written about
it over the years. The foreign state waives the immunity of its commercial enterprises in the particulars spelled out in article 11. Attachment is not one of them. In other words, we are not engaged in
deductive reasoning. We are just looking at facts. All the evidence
that there is about the subject points in one direction. Now, whether
you would imply a waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachments when the statute excludes implicit waivers with respect to such
attachments is another issue.
Edward Gordon: Yes, but Mark, the statute has two
exceptions: the section 1609 savings provision and section 1610(d)
which requires an explicit waiver. 09 You can then read these two as
identical, or substantially identical, or you can read them differently.
Mark Feldman: Yes, as I have already said, section 1609 is an
issue and we have not taken a position on that issue.
Alan Swan: Let me understand this; you have taken a position
that if the section 1609 savings clause is operative in the case of
implied waivers-if you make that assumption-then there is, in fact,
an implied waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachments in the
1955 Treaty?

109. For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1609, see supra note 100. For the text of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1610(d), see supra note 103.
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Mark Feldman: No, that is precisely what we have not decided.
Edward Gordon: Have you taken a position that insofar as the
question is whether there is an explicit waiver, there is no explicit
waiver?
Mark Feldman: Right, there is no explicit waiver.
Michael Silverman: If the Statement of Interest reflects the Government's current position that there is a difference between a suit
against a government airline and one against the army, the latter not
being subject to the waiver, article 11 in paragraph 4 of the 1955
Treaty talks about enterprises engaged in commercial activities as
opposed to commercial enterprises. The army certainly can be engaged in commercial activities, and that is the basis of the dispute in
many decisions.
Alan Swan: Isn't there some history in the Immunities Act itself
about the "nature" of the transaction?
Mark Feldman: That does not apply to the text of the 1955
Treaty; it applies to the Immunities Act.
Michael Silverman: Isn't the argument being made in relation to
all FCN treaties that, under the better view, the waiver applies only
to commercial enterprises? Yet, on the face of the 1955 Treaty, it
seems to apply to enterprises engaged in commercial activities.
Mark Feldman: The words "engaged in commercial activities"
are not the same thing as having committed or undertaken a transaction which may be commercial in nature. It is like engaged "in doing
business." That is the way we read it and, as I said, all the contemporary commentary, the subsequent interpretations, and the presentations to Congress point to that as being the intention of the negotiators, whether that fits the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity or
not. I just do not think people conduct themselves according to the
canons of construction to which Charlie Brower had reference. You
embark on a negotiation and the theory is you tell the foreign state,
"If you want your state-owned enterprises to do business in our country, they are going to have be on the same plane as private enterprises
with whom they are competing." None of these countries would have
agreed to waive immunity for the army or what-have-you. It just is
not done.
Hans Smit: After all, if after application of the Tate Letter the
army buys shoes for its purposes, we apply the restrictive theory even
though the army is not a commercial enterprise. So I think that this
fits well within the Tate Letter. It does not make any difference how
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you characterize the enterprise; it makes a difference what the enterprise in fact does.
Mark Feldman: That is true for the Immunities Act, but it was
not clear before that Act that the Tate Letter would be applied that
way. Certainly, it was not applied that way in any consistent manner
by the State Department. But when we put forward the Immunities
Act-as Charlie Brower's testimony indicates-we gave the restrictive
theory the interpretation you indicate. We have not given that gloss to
our FCN treaties because they are not unilateral, there are other
parties to those treaties. They have a view, and it is the understanding
that we have with them that must be carried forward. That under-

standing is very clear.
Charles Brower: I disagree with that. There is plenty of evidence
the other way.
Mark Feldman: Well, particularly in connection with the negotiations with the Netherlands, it was very meticulously made a matter
of record. I will send it to you. Look at our brief in the EDS case. It
gives you quite a bit of it.
Cynthia Lichtenstein: Perhaps we need to distinguish here between the doctrine of restrictive immunity as an international law
doctrine and what the parties intended to agree upon in a treaty
between themselves. In the case of the 1955 Treaty you are interpreting the intent of the two parties as to what they meant by "enterprises
engaged in commercial activities."
Mark Feldman: That is what I am trying to say. I would also say
that it is impossible within the plain meaning of language to call a
"state" an "enterprise."
Hans Smit: Oh! I find that very easy; it is a social or political
enterprise engaged in commercial activities.
Michael Reisman: Yes, Mark, and your interpretation does include, within the ambit of the waiver, government agencies and
instrumentalities. Therefore, "enterprise" does include government
agencies and instrumentalities, and those agencies and instrumentalities compose the "state."
Mark Feldman: But which are engaged in enterprise? That is the

whole point.
Edward Gordon: In Judge Duffy's decision 1 last October, he
said that sovereign immunity itself was not a right under international
110. New England Merchants Natl Bank v. Iran Power Co., 502 F. Supp. 120

(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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law; that it is a matter of courtesy or comity or something of the sort.
Is that position now at issue? If not, is it accepted that in the absence
of a statute, such as the Immunities Act, sovereign immunity is to be
withheld from an unfriendly state? The question has been raised
whether Iran would be entitled to immunity in any case, since it was
engaged in hostile activities against the United States; that it was not a
friendly nation. If it is simply a matter of comity then presumably it is
not entitled to immunity.
Charles Brower: That position has been argued, yes. Some of us
did not go out of our way to argue it-we had differing views about
its theoretical respectability-but it has been advanced strongly by a
lot of good people. One terrific example, for use by professors who
wish to teach their students how decisions are really made and why
law cases move the way they do, is to be derived from the writings of
Judge Duffy. You never would have had even Judge Duffy, I am
convinced, arriving at the decision that he did, were it not for the fact
that Judge Duffy had to get around Judge Duffy. He had to get
around a case, predating the seizure of the hostages, in which he had
decided, in dictum, that under the 1955 Treaty there was no waiver
of immunity from prejudgment attachment."' Faced with an entirely different political situation in his later decision, the only way
that he could uphold the attachments without contradicting himself
was to adopt what, essentially, everybody thought was a somewhat
dubious theory. The result was to place right back in the hands of the
executive branch the determination of whether or not a foreign state
enjoys sovereign immunity and totally take it out of the courts.
Mark Feldman: I have to confess that there was some question in
the executive branch about the merits of that. I tried to sell the idea,
but no one else would buy it-except Judge Duffy. I thought that once
it was argued by the claimants it was open for us to grab on to it, but
it was not thought to be too critical.
Hans Smit: I might mention that the first time I propounded this
idea to a consortium of lawyers, they reacted in the same skeptical
fashion. When I saw that Judge Duffy adopted it, I was heartened by
the notion that, even though people laugh at me, I might be right.
Harold Maier: Mark, let me go back to what you were saying.
Are you saying that the Government wanted that interpretation?

111. Reading and Bates Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 438 F.Supp. 724
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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Mark Feldman: We did not take a position before the courts to
that effect. We were discussing it. In State, Treasury, and Justice, we
were discussing for many months what to do about this since we were
always coming in with a request for a stay.
Harold Maier: Four years ago there were some great sighs of
relief in the State Department, as I remember, when the Immunities
Act finally passed. Everybody said: "We don't have to get involved in
sovereign immunity cases anymore." You are not going back on that
are you?
Mark Feldman: Ah, that is not a fair comment. [Laughter] As
Charlie Brower always says, "We are defending the national interest
and trying to resolve the Iranian crisis." That has nothing to do with
trying to decide facts pertinent to determining questions of sovereign
immunity-that we've given up to the courts.
Alan Swan: But is it not true, Mark, that your position on the
constitutional issue is much aided-vastly aided-by Judge Duffy's
position that, in fact, only your license validates the prejudgment
attachment? If indeed it does flow from your license alone, then you
are just revoking a license that you did not have to give in the first
instance. In your brief, implicitly at least, that seems to be what you
are pushing for.
Michael Reisman: I seem to be missing the constitutional issue.
Are you saying that the power to grant the license, the IEEPA power,
overrides the Sovereign Immunities Act?
Alan Swan: That, I agree, may be an issue; but I am making a
different point here. Let us put it in two contexts. First, assume that,
absent a freeze, the attached property would not have been immune
from prejudgment attachment. Under that assumption the only purpose of the Treasury license was to overcome the adverse effect of the
blocking order on the right of the American claimants to get a prejudgment attachment. Also, under that assumption, once the Government rescinds the blocking order, the license is essentially moot. The
necessity for the license is removed. Under these circumstances, the
Government's order of transfer and the order suspending or nullifying
the attachments are in effect grants of immunity contrary to the
denial of immunity by the Immunity Act read along with the 1955
Treaty. As such, they would have to be sustained on IEEPA authority.
I doubt that the President can grant an immunity which a statute or a
treaty denies, unless he can rest his action on another statute. This, I
suggest, is the teaching of the Steel Seizure Case.12 In other words,
112. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1953).
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IEEPA has to be interpreted as a grant of a right in the Executive to
overcome the lack of immunity under the Immunities Act or the 1955
Treaty. Moreover, not only does the grant of power in IEEPA have to
overcome the denial of immunity under the Immunities Act or the
1955 Treaty, but that power has to be in the form of a power to
regulate the exercise of the normal jurisdiction of the federal courtsa power reserved to Congress under article III of the Constitution. "3
On the other hand, if the property was, as Judge Duffy said,
otherwise immune under the Immunities Act and the 1955 Treaty,
and if the only way the claimant got the attachment was through a
revocable license from the Treasury Department, then, of course, the
Government could just revoke the license without interfering with the
normal incidence of the judicial power.
Michael Silverman: The import of that leads to the question
whether there is a deprivation or a taking which would give the
claimants a right to go before the Court of Claims or some other court
to sue for damages. The argument that some claimants could make is
that there is an inchoate property right in these prejudgment attachments.
Mark Feldman: I do not think I understood what you were
saying. I missed it at a key moment. Do you think that there is a
limitation in article III on the exercise of the President's power under
IEEPA to prevent the establishment or acquisition of new interests in
property?
Alan Swan: No, I think it goes to the construction of the IEEPA
power. Let me put it this way. I have in mind those lovely old cases
where the Supreme Court struggled with the question whether a court
that lacked the power to execute its judgments was an article III
court. "4 As you know in Glidden v. Zdanok,1 5 Justice Harlan struggles through that idea with reference to the Court of Claims, saying,
well, there is a standby appropriations statute to pay judgments under
$100,000 and the Congress has never turned down judgments over
$100,000 anyway, so it seems plain that the power to execute judgments is an inherent power of an article III court. Now, the power in
article III to limit the jurisdiction of such courts is given to Congress.

113. U.S. CONsT., art. III, § 1, construed in Sheldon v. Sill 49 U.S. (9 How.) 440
(1850).
114. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 447 (1886); Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S.

(2 Wall) 561 (1865), appendix at 117 U.S. 697 (1885).
115. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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It is a fairly extraordinary power. It seems to me, therefore, that if the
attached property was not immune under the Immunities Act, the
Government's reliance on IEEPA depends upon showing that IEEPA
delegated to the Executive the power, first, to regulate the jurisdiction
of the federal courts and, second, to exercise that power in a manner
contrary to the grant of jurisdiction implicit in the Immunities Act's
denial of immunity. That is quite an extraordinary authority to give
to the Executive, and one must be careful before construing IEEPA as
such a delegation of power. I doubt that, on its face, the language of
IEEPA can bear the weight.
Mark Feldman: I thought of it as a substantive power, not a
power dealing with the jurisdiction of the courts, but a power to
prevent the acquisition through judicial process or otherwise of interests in the foreign-owned property.
Alan Swan: That is the question. Sure, IEEPA may be a grant of
power to foreclose the acquisition of interests in property, or even to
nullify interests in property. But which interests? Does it necessarily
include interests acquired through the judicial process when, in fact,
the nullification of those interests would foreclose an article III court
from exercising a normal incidence of the judicial power?
Mark Feldman: If you could not do that, you could not have a
blocking program.
Alan Swan: You can have a blocking program; a blocking program does not require that you foreclose the exercise of the judicial
power as the Government proved when it said, by its regulations, "Go
ahead with the judicial attachments."
Robert Mundheim: I do not understand what you mean. What
the Government thought is that the Congress had said that the President may do various things, among them, "prevent or prohibit any
acquisition." Under that language, the President says to the claimants, "You can not get any right in this property." Are you saying that
the President may prohibit you from obtaining a right by voluntary
agreement, but that you have a constitutional right to go to a court
and say that the court ought to give you a right in this property
because it is yours, because Iran promised to yield it to you, and the
court has to effectuate that right? Is that the point? Are you then
saying that, by this statute, one is being unconstitutionally precluded
from going to court and asking the court to give them that kind of
relief?
Alan Swan: Let me put it somewhat differently. When it comes
to a statute with such broad language as IEEPA, one interpretation is
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that it does authorize the President to foreclose a person from acquiring rights by private agreement. The question, however, is whether
Congress intended to go a further step and authorize the President to
prevent the acquisition of a right where the right would otherwise
flow from the normal exercise of the judicial power to execute judgments. The problem becomes doubly acute if Congress, in the Immunities Act and the 1955 Treaty, read together, had made the property
subject to that power of execution. These are prejudgment attachments in aid of execution. These are not prejudgment attachments for
jurisdictional purposes. And that is a question which is not, it seems to
me, determinable from the face of this statute.
Robert Mundheim: My understanding is that that kind of prohibition on judicial activity existed under the old Trading with the
Enemy Act.""
Mark Feldman: Sixty years of history.
Robert Mundheim: Here you have a new act which reimposes or
regrants that kind of authority in the light of our history.
Alan Swan: You may be right. But it is a matter to be established
from history and the legislative record and not a matter that can be
settled on the bare words of the statute. I think you have to look at the
history very carefully.
Edward Gordon: I have a question along the lines of Bob
Mundheim's point. Isn't the IEEPA meant to reduce the Executive's
authority in matters like this, as opposed to maintaining the preexisting legal regime?
Alan Swan: Certainly on the vesting point.
Edward Gordon: So when you speak of extremely broad language, what is the significance of extremely broad language in a
statute with that purpose?
Mark Feldman: You are overstating it.
Edward Gordon: I probably am.
Mark Feldman: It is precisely the vesting point. Otherwise, there
is no evidence, as far as I know, of any intention of Congress to
narrow the President's powers.
Edward Gordon: Well, it was part of a larger context. IEEPA
did not simply reenact the old regime.
116. Ch. 106 § 1, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified in 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 1-6, 7-39,
41-44 (1976)).
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Robert Mundheim: It was principally a procedural reform.
Edward Gordon: But would you not say that in the context of the
mid-seventies, all of this legislation, including IEEPA, was designed
to reassert the role of Congress and by implication, if not directly (I
would say directly) reduce the Executive's total autonomy in matters
touching the conduct of foreign relations?
Mark Feldman: I think Bob Mundheim was right. It was a
procedural reform. As initially proposed, the National Emergencies
Act (NEA)1 7 left the Trading with the Enemy Act intact. Later that
Act was excised from the NEA. We had hearings the following year
and wanted to find a way of saving the substance of the old act. I
think our purpose was very clear: to save the substance-but to put
that substance into a new procedural framework, the focus of which
was to prevent the indefinite continuation of states of national emergency into which one could then place separate substantive grants of
regulatory authority. But the basic blocking power-the heart of the
program-and the experience which comes out of the international
claims situation was readily accepted by Congress. That was the most
sacrosanct of all the powers that Congress intended to save, going so
far as to preserve the ability of the Executive to maintain these prohibitions even after a national emergency had been terminated.
Stefan Riesenfeld: On your point concerning the history of this
subject of blocking under the old Trading with the Enemy Act, the
former Attorney General, Mr. Civiletti, in his opinion" 8 to President
Carter, cites a number of Supreme Court cases. You ought to read the
cases cited there very carefully beginning with the discussion of Orvis
v. Brownell." 9 You will see, I think, that they do not say exactly
what they are cited for. You will see that the Supreme Court has
distinguished between acquiring rights by attachment vis-A-vis the
United States and acquiring rights vis-h-vis the old owner, which
would here be Iran. The Court was very careful to say that attachments against blocked property created rights vis-A-vis the former
owner, but did not create rights vis-h-vis the United States. If you now
return the assets to the former owner, the attachment creditor loses his
right against that owner, so I have difficulty in seeing how the cases
which Mr. Civiletti cited really support the Government's action here.
Those cases only affirmed that the United States has a right in blocked

117. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1978) [for text, see infra Appendix at 200].
118. Civiletti Opinion Letter, supra note 97.

119. 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
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assets superior to the attachment creditor, not that the former owner
has such a right. I am not saying that it cannot be done, but certainly
the reliance on these cases proves too much.
Mark Feldman: Steve, would you repeat that?
Stefan Riesenfeld: Mr. Civiletti cites several cases2 that say that
once the government permits creditors to reach assets by attachment,
those attachment creditors do not require any rights vis-h-vis the
custodian, but that the creditor does acquire rights against the former
owner, which in this case would be Iran. Now the United States
Government says, "We will return these assests to the former owner
and the attachment creditor will lose his rights." Such an action
would not seem to find support in those cases. I am not saying that
you could not find another theory, but at least the authorities cited by
Mr. Civiletti prove, in my mind, just exactly the opposite from what
he cites them for: that the attachment creditor does have rights in
the property as against the former owner, which rights, by the sending of the property back to the former owner, are now lost.
Mark Feldman: That is where I am having trouble; if they are
lost, they are not rights, they are not rights which are being protected
from being divested.
Stefan Riesenjeld: Only because the United States is now sending
them back to the former owner.
Mark Feldman: And in the cases cited by Civiletti, the Court said
we could do that. Right?
Stejan Riesenfeld: No. In those old cases the Supreme Court only
held that a creditor could not, by attachment, acquire any rights
against the custodian. Therefore, the assets could vest in the United
States in spite of the attachment. But, in those cases, the Court was
equally adamant in saying that the attachment creditor did acquire
rights against the former owner, the enemy alien. Now the United
States, without vesting, is sending assets back to the former ownerIran-and citing these cases as authority for doing so. That is not
what those cases stand for.
Robert Mundheim: Just to clarify, were those rights acquired
after a blocking order, or were they acquired under a preblocking
attachment?
Stefan Riesenjeld: After blocking.

120. The cases are Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U.S. 183 (1953) and Propper v. Clark,

337 U.S. 472 (1949). Statement of Interest, supra note 33.
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Robert Mundheim: And without a license?
Stejan Riesenfeld: There was a license and the United States
argued the point. The Supreme Court commented upon that statement and said that a creditor could acquire rights by attachmentunlicensed attachment or licensed attachment-against the former
owner. Also, it said that the creditor could not acquire rights by
unlicensed attachments against the custodian or the United States.
And then the Court said that even if you were licensed, you did not
acquire any rights against the vesting of the property in the United
States. In making this point, I am only criticizing the reasoning of
former Attorney General Civiletti. I do not say that you cannot
accomplish your purpose on other grounds, but to cite these cases in
support of the Government's action is not really correct. The Supreme
Court very carefully distinguished between rights against the owner
and rights against the custodian.
Mark Feldman: Steve, I am not sure that I agree with you. I say
"I am not sure" quite sincerely. I have learned from experience that to
question Professor Riesenfeld's reading of a case you must have a lot of
nerve and you run a substantial risk of being wrong. Nevertheless, I
take some comfort in the fact that I am certain those cases are unreadable, all of them. [Laughter]
Hans Smit: You mean the paper in the Justice Department has
disintegrated?
Mark Feldman: No, it's the Supreme Court's Report. I do not
think they say what Steve suggests. I think there was a complete
turnaround-the typical situation of the Supreme Court reversing
itself 180 degrees and then not wanting to admit it. Therefore, you get
a terrible problem in drawing distinctions between the cases. There is
one case I understand; the other one I do not understand at all. One of
them said that the Government only got what the former owner had
to give when it vested. By that time there had already been an
attachment and, therefore, the attachment was valid against the custodian. In the Orvis case, it was just the opposite. It was not valid
against the custodian. Why? The Court said that the attachment in
that case was only intended to create an interest inter se and that it
was not intended to create a vested right. Those are just words as far
as I can make out, the facts are the same. So the Court changed its
mind.
Stefan Riesenjeld: My only point is, why do you cite these decisions?
Mark Feldman: No, I think the Attorney General was right in
citing Orvis. Orvis supports his position, perhaps Propper v. Clark
does not. I do not know about the others; I leave that to you.
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Michael Silverman: Again, on the point of history, isn't it clear
that IEEPA does not give the Executive the power to vest propertyas did the Trading with the Enemy Act? But isn't the practical effect
of the Executive action the turning over of the monies to the Federal
Reserve so that it can leave the country, and isn't that, in effect,
vesting those monies in the United States?
Mark Feldman: That is what Judge Porter was saying. He sayswhat the Executive is doing here is
in a wonderful phrase-that
"vesting custody."'12' I do not think that is likely to stand up. The
word "vesting" would mean to anybody the "taking" of a property
interest, of title, or other usable interest in property.
2 2
Justice Harlan said that you
Hans Smit: Well, in Snaidach,1
take a person's property when you take away from him the temporary
enjoyment of it.

Robert Mundheim: But that proves too much, Hans, because
that means that every blocking is a vesting, and that is precisely what
the Congress did not intend. To separate blocking and vesting you
have to give each distinct meanings. To say that removing some of the
powers of ownership and the ability to transfer the assets is a vesting,
suggests that Congress in no way accomplished what it wanted to do.
I do not think you normally make that interpretation.
Cynthia Lichtenstein: Assume a claimant who would have the
right to a prejudgment attachment, however you argue it. Maybe
there is an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment. The claimant gets its prejudgment attachment and then comes
the question whether under section 1702 of IEEPA the President can
stay that attachment. Assume that under IEEPA the President can do
it, unless you say that IEEPA itself, by giving the power to the
President, violates the separation of powers. Assume next that Congress may authorize the President to stay the attachment; it is just a
stay-the attachment is still there, it just is not operating but the
claimant has not lost his legal right to have the property kept within
the jurisdiction of the court. Next, the President orders the property to
leave the country, thereby nullifying the attachment altogether. If we
say that the President is authorized to do that by IEEPA, isn't that a
taking for which the claimant has a constitutional right to compensation-"just compensation" for a taking in the public interest? The

121. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Social Security Org. of Iran, 508 F.Supp. 1350,
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claimant then goes into the Court of Claims and says, "My property
was taken from me by the Government. The Government has the
power to do it but to the extent that I lost the ability to realize on my
original legal claim against the government of Iran, the attached
property was actually used by the United States Government and the
latter must compensate me."
Tone Grant: There is a question concerning who has the legal
right to the Iranian assets frozen in the United States. The basis for the
issuance of prejudgment attachments by the American courts was, in
part, the statement by the Iranians that they were removing their
assets from the United States and repudiating their obligations to U.S.
nationals. Since there has not been an adjudication of the claims of
U.S. nationals, there is an issue concerning what right, if any, the
U.S. claimants have in the frozen assets. I believe that the Executive
orders that have been issued provide, in part, that the assets that have
been frozen in U.S. banks will be transferred to the Federal Reserve
Bank for deposit into an account that will be made available for the
payment of the claims of U.S. nationals. As a result of the prejudgment attachments which were issued, there is a question raised concerning what, if any, rights in the frozen assets the claimants have. I
do not believe that there has necessarily been a divesting of the rights
of any U.S. claimant until it is finally adjudicated whether the various
claims are valid.
Edward Gordon: I need clarification on a point about attachments generally. Does the court have to be authorized by statute to
grant that extraordinary remedy? Or could a court, in appropriate
circumstances and in the absence of a statutory bar, grant that remedy? Can prejudgment attachments be granted under state law, for
example, unless they are barred?
123
Alan Swan: Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
refers the federal courts to state statutes.
123. The text of the rule is as follows:
Seizure of Person or Property
At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all
remedies providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of
securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action
are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the
law of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the
remedy is sought, subject to the following qualifications: (1) any existing
statute of the United States governs to the extent to which it is applicable;
(2) the action in which any of the foregoing remedies is used shall be
commenced and prosecuted or, if removed from a state court, shall be
prosecuted after removal, pursuant to these rules. The remedies thus
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Edward Gordon: Is it not, therefore, at least arguable that the
right of those claimants who have obtained attachments might not be
exclusively based on the Immunities Act? Isn't that at least a plausible
argument?
Stejan Riesenfeld: The British courts did exactly that when they
invented the "Mareva" injunction1 4 which you heard about earlier.
But our courts have said that they would not do anything like the
"Mareva" injunction because they are bound by the rules of statutory
attachment, which are granted by state law and taken over by the
Federal Rules, and, therefore, because equity follows the law, they
could not go beyond those statutes. Although they invented the temporary restraining order, they did not go so far as permitting
"Mareva" injunctions because, they said, that is governed by statute
and the courts therefore do not have the power. At least that is the
orthodox explanation for the courts not granting equitable attachments or, in other words, applying the extraordinary powers which
they otherwise might have.
Alan Swan: But isn't it true, Steve, that if the statutorily mandated Federal Rules had not said anything on the subject, those courts
could, under their general equitable powers, have fashioned that kind
of injunctive relief?
Stejan Riesenfeld: They might have done so.
Mark Feldman: There are two points I would make in stating the
Government's position on some of these questions. First, in most of the
cases against Iran-all but one as far as I am aware-there were no
attachments until after the freeze. In fact, there were very few suits.
The freeze held the assets here. It was only a couple of weeks later that
there was an authorization for the attachments. That authorization
was given within the framework of regulations which made clear that
the attachments were revocable. So whatever the Supreme Court held
in those other cases is probably not applicable to the situation where
there is plain notice to the attachment creditor. The equities are just
not there in the same sense as some might think.
Now, a second point: Everyone talks about state law and that is
what these attachments are. I think it is time to raise Pink 125 and
available include arrest, attachment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration, and other corresponding or equivalent remedies, however designated
and regardless of whether by state procedure the remedy is ancillary to an
action or must be obtained by an independent action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
124. Mareva v. Int'l Bulkcarriers, [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509.
125. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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Belmont12 6 because what we are really talking about here, wholly
apart from the IEEPA power, is the question of the President's constitutional authority to settle claims. You have a very clear statement by
the Supreme Court in Pink and Belmont that state-created interests
are overridden by the President's exercise of that power.
Alan Swan: Mark, you have laid a nice predicate for opening our
discussion on the constitutional question. Are there any more comments regarding our current subject?
John Westburg: Just for the record I would point out that the
Government, by blocking Iran's assets and shortly thereafter licensing
the bringing of legal proceedings in the courts, did invite the claimants to bring these suits. Now, at the end of the game, after all the
money they have invested in these suits, the claimants are understandably worried about them going down the drain. I just say that for the
record!
Robert Mundheim: They knew the ground rules; they knew how
the game might play out. They knew that they only had the typical
type of license under the blocking statutes.
Mark Feldman: And when asked why they were bringing suits
under these conditions, attorneys typically told us: "In case you don't
get a program," or, "So that we will be there with priority, if your
diplomacy fails." But now we have a program.
Hans Smit: To the extent the program tells you to go to Iran, it is
not much of a program.
Mark Feldman: That is not our program.
Hans Smit: Ah, but it is under this agreement-as Iran reads it.
Mark Feldman: Well, that may be.
Alan Swan: Just as a point of history, Mark, did we ever have a
situation where the Government blocked foreign assets for the purpose
of securing American claims or, at least started off that way, and then
entered into a settlement that called for the blocked assets to be
transferred back to the foreign government while American claims on
those assets were eliminated? Now, in the Iran situation, I realize
some of the claims will go into the arbitral process and some assets are
being set aside for that purpose. But with regard to the rest of the
claims, have we ever had a settlement where blocked assets were not
actually used to pay off American claims?

126. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 325 (1937).
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Robert Mundheim: The Chinese assets! We got a promise of $80
million in cash from the Chinese and then said, "The blocked property is yours to the extent that you can persuade an American court
that it is yours. "
Alan Swan: And there were suits pending against China in the
courts of the United States at that time?
Covey Oliver: Yes. One before Judge Goodman in the Northern
District of California pending since 1952! 127
Mark Feldman: Is that so? I never knew that.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SETTLEMENT

Alan Swan: We're going to pick up where we left off at the end of
last session with a discussion of the constitutionality of the agreements. There are a number of facets to this issue and it may be helpful
to lay some of them out, especially since there are some particularly
pertinent provisions in the agreements which we ought not to forget.
At one level, we must concern ourselves with the power of the President to settle private international claims. One does not, I suppose,
have much quarrel with the proposition that if the President can
negotiate a settlement which results in full payment of all claims, he
has the power to make that settlement. The problem arises where, as
part of the settlement process, he undertakes to terminate or nullify
the legal rights asserted by the private claimants and obtains, in
return, only partial payment or, in some cases, no payment whatsoever. A variant of this, of course, is the situation where, as in the case
of a substantial number of the claims against Iran, the President
undertakes to foreclose the claimants' right to seek their remedy in a
court of law and remands them to an alternative arbitral tribunal. I
hope that the arbitral process will result in full payment of all provable claims, but there is an apprehension that that may not happen. I
do not really know how one deals with that apprehension in the
context of these constitutional issues at this time. Nevertheless, it is
28
well to note article IV(3) of the Claims Settlement Agreement
which, as I understand it, provides that should a claimant receive an
award from the arbitral tribunal and should there not be sufficient
funds available to satisfy that award under the escrow account, the
127. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59
(N.D. Cal. 1952) modified, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
128. This provision provides: "Any award which the Tribunal may render against
either Government shall be enforceable against such Government in the courts of any
nation in accordance with its laws."

